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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS AND
POSTCONVICTION CLAIMS OF ACTUAL
INNOCENCE BASED ON DNA EVIDENCE
J. Brent Alldredge*
I. INTRODUCTION
INCE the early 1990s, deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") testing has
become the "most reliable forensic technique for identifying
criminals" and is "increasingly commonplace in pretrial investiga-
tions."1 Despite its increasing role in criminal investigations, however,
DNA testing was not generally available prior to 1994.2 As the use of
DNA testing has become more widespread, state and federal prisoners
have sought to employ the technology to produce evidence of actual in-
nocence in the hope that it will lead to postconviction exoneration. This
hope is based upon the potential of DNA testing to yield a greater
amount of highly-accurate information and, by doing so, "provide[ ] a
more reliable basis for establishing a correct verdict than any evidence
proffered at the original trial," even with decades-old biological mate-
rial.3 As of November 2002, in fact, there have been a number of high-
profile crimes in which 115 wrongfully-convicted men and women have
been exonerated through the use of DNA testing.4
The large number of postconviction exonerations has piqued the public
interest and prompted the question: Why do inmates remain in prison
despite DNA evidence that would otherwise exonerate them if the sci-
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.A., 2000, Brigham Young University.
1. Innocence Protection Act, S. 486, 107th Cong. § 101(a)(1), (3) (2001); see also In-
nocence Protection Act, H.R. 912, 107th Cong. (2001).
2. S. 486 § 101(a)(3). DNA evidence was first introduced in a United States Court in
1986 and, after numerous court challenges, is now admitted in all United States jurisdic-
tions. NAT'L INSTr. OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICIION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
HANDLING REQUESTS 1 (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/177626.pdf
(last visited Jan. 3, 2003) [hereinafter RECOMMENDNIONS].
3. S. 486 § 101(a)(3), (4).
4. Man Freed by DNA Test After 20 Years, CNN.com, Nov. 7, 2002, at http://www.cnn.
com/2002/LAW/11/07/DNA.freed.ap/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2002). It is also sig-
nificant to note that "[i]n more than a dozen cases, post-conviction DNA testing that has
exonerated an innocent person has also enhanced public safety by providing evidence that
led to the identification of the actual perpetrator." S. 486 § 101(a)(6). See, e.g., DNA
Evidence That Freed One Man in Rape Case Leads to Another's Arrest, CNN.com, Nov. 19,
2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/Northeast/ 1/1 9/dna.arrest.ap/index.html (last visited
Nov. 19, 2002); Jodi Wilgoren, DNA That Freed Three Matches New Suspects, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2002, at A18.
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ence of DNA testing can now establish with near certainty who did or did
not commit a crime? 5 Renewed concerns about the inefficiencies of the
criminal justice system and the appropriateness of the death penalty are
the inevitable results of such a question. Emphasizing the tragedies
replayed in the headlines, 6 for example, authors have undertaken the task
of illustrating the sometimes less-than-reliable tools employed by police
and prosecutors and how some criminal trials go awry; 7 a number of these
authors have also called for a nationwide moratorium on the death pen-
alty until these problems can be adequately addressed.8 Illinois and Ma-
ryland have already instituted death penalty moratoria and two federal
district courts have gone as far as to declare the Federal Death Penalty
Act unconstitutional because it creates an undue risk that innocent per-
sons are being convicted of capital crimes. While one of these decisions
has already been reversed by the Second Circuit and the other is being
challenged on similar grounds, it is clear that the law is far from settled. 9
Responding to the onslaught of unpleasant media and judicial revela-
tions, particularly with respect to the possibility of innocent people being
executed or incarcerated for extended sentences, the public has also be-
come wary of the serious problems facing the criminal justice system. In
a bipartisan survey conducted for The Justice Project, for example, public
concerns were reflected in finding that "80% of Americans support re-
forming or abolishing the death penalty, and 64% support suspending ex-
ecutions entirely until issues of fairness in capital punishment can be
resolved." 10 Even former Attorney General Janet Reno has voiced her
concerns. Spurred by a 1996 research report issued by the National Insti-
tute of Justice ("NIJ"), I I she acknowledged the fallibility of the criminal
justice system and requested that the NIJ establish a National Commis-
sion on the Future of DNA Evidence to identify ways to maximize the
value of DNA testing and immediately address the issues surrounding
5. See The Case for Innocence, PBS Frontline, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/case/etc/synopsis.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
6. See, e.g., Man Freed by DNA Test After 20 Years, supra note 4; Sara Rimer, DNA
Testing in Rape Cases Frees Prisoner After 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at A12; see
also Wilgoren, supra note 4.
7. See, e.g., BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION
AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
8. See id.
9. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2002: YEAR
END REPORT 3-4 (2002), at http://justice.policy.net/relatives/21160.pdf (last visited Jan. 3,
2003).
10. New Survey Shows Overwhelming Majority Supports Changes to Death Penalty,
The Justice Project, at http://justice.policy.net/proactive/newsroom (last visited Jan. 3,
2003). But cf. Interview by John Ydstie, NPR: All Things Considered, with Andrew Kohut,
Director, Pew Research Center for The People & The Press (Apr. 15, 2002) (indicating
that most other polls show that about two-thirds of the public still favor the use of the
death penalty).
11. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICIED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
S'rUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFIER TRIAL (1996),
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2003) (presenting
case studies of twenty-eight inmates for whom DNA testing was exculpatory).
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postconviction application of evidence resulting from such testing.' 2
Why, then, do inmates remain in prison despite DNA evidence that
would otherwise exonerate them? 13 The answer to this question is not as
simple as it may intuitively seem. Because of the constitutional safe-
guards that make it more difficult for a state to overturn the presumption
of innocence and establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and because
of the accused's right to appellate review in both state and federal courts,
it is also more difficult for the legal system to subsequently ignore the fact
that the accused was found guilty despite these safeguards. Chief Justice
Harlan Stone appropriately asked: "Is it not desirable that at some point
of time further consideration of criminal cases by the court should be at
an end, after which appeals should be made to Executive clemency
alone?"'14 In other words, where is the line to be drawn?
Writing for the court in Herrera v. Collins, Chief Justice Rehnquist
clearly answered this question.' 5 He reaffirmed the fact that the determi-
nation of an accused's guilt or innocence in a state criminal trial is "a
decisive and portentous event" and that state trials were not meant to be
relitigated in the federal courts.' 6 Because "[slociety's resources have
been concentrated [in a state criminal trial] in order to decide, within the
limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one of its
citizens,"' 7 Rehnquist continued, "[flew rulings would be more disruptive
of our federal system than to provide for federal habeas review of free-
standing claims of actual innocence."' 8
II. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
A. THE GREAT WRIT
Although the term habeas corpus is technically a general term referring
to a number of different writs originating under English statutory and
common law, it is used most frequently in reference to the writ of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum. 19 This writ provides an extraordinary remedy
that was neither designed to compensate for past injustice nor to penalize
the responsible government agent, but to ensure the integrity of the pro-
cess resulting in imprisonment by inquiring into the legality of an individ-
12. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at iii.
13. The Case for Innocence, supra note 5.
14. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 409 n.7 (1993) (quoting 7 DRAFTING HISTORY OF
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3, 7 (M. Wilken & N. Triffin eds., 1991)
(Chief Justice Harlan Stone responding to the second preliminary draft of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure)).
15. Herrera, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
16. Id. at 401 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)).
17. Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
18. Id.
19. Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611 (1961). This is the application of the term as
it will be employed in this paper; references to habeas corpus should be understood as
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum.
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ual's confinement. 20 Blackstone observed that
the flagrant abuse of any power ... has always been productive of a
struggle; which either discovers the exercise of that power to be con-
trary to law, or (if legal) restrains it for the future .... The oppres-
sion of an obscure individual gave birth to the famous habeas corpus
act, which is frequently considered another magna carta ... and by
consequence ... has reduced the method of proceeding ... to the
true standard of law and liberty.2'
For these reasons, habeas corpus is sometimes referred to as "the great
writ of liberty"2 2 or, simply, the "Great Writ. '23
Despite the Federal Constitution's mandate that "[t]he privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,' 24 it was generally under-
stood that the Constitution guaranteed only that state habeas corpus be
available to federal prisoners-probably because the states were consid-
ered the primary protectors of individual liberty.25 As a result, Congress
initially refused to grant federal courts habeas jurisdiction in state cases. 26
In 1789, however, Congress authorized the federal courts to grant writs of
habeas corpus to federal prisoners27 and, in 1867, extended the courts'
jurisdiction to encompass state prisoners as well. 2s As currently codified,
the writ of habeas corpus extends to anyone "in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."'29
The writ itself is essentially a writ of error, which brings up the body of
the person alleging illegal confinement;30 however, it is a new lawsuit,
collateral in nature, 3 1 and in no way appellate for the purpose of review-
ing errors.32 This means that the court exercising jurisdiction sits to en-
sure that individuals are not confined in violation of the Constitution, as
opposed to weighing the evidence in order to correct errors of fact or
determine anew the guilt or innocence of a prisoner.33 By restricting fed-
eral habeas review to issues of Constitutional concern, a court need only
address whether the custodian has the authority to deprive the petitioner
of his constitutionally-protected liberty. 34
To reach this stage of review, however, a state prisoner petitioning a
federal court for a writ of habeas corpus must first exhaust all available
20. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAi HISTORY OF HAI3EAS CORPUS 3 (1980).
21. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135 (internal citation and emphases
omitted).
22. Id.
23. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
24. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
25. DUKER, supra note 20, at 181.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 182-86 (discussing the Judiciary Act of 1789).
28. Id. at 189-99 (discussing the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867).
29. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (2002).
30. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193 (1830).
31. Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393 (1924).
32. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 305 (1888).
33. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400-01.
34. Reed v. People. 745 P.2d 235, 238 (Colo. 1987).
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state remedies, demonstrate that there is no available state corrective
process, or demonstrate that circumstances exist that would render such a
process ineffective.3 5 This means that the petitioner must exhaust three
distinct judicial processes before a federal court will entertain the possi-
bility of issuing a writ: (1) trial and direct appeal, (2) state postconviction
review, and (3) federal habeas corpus review. 36 Procedurally, it did not
appear that it would be difficult to comply with these requirements fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's 1963 decision in Fai v. Noia.37 In Fai, the
Court acknowledged the federal courts' broad powers to grant a writ of
habeas corpus for "whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. ' 38
This expansive and empowering view, however, lent itself to much criti-
cism. Critics contended, for example, that "when used 'improperly,'
[habeas corpus] impedes finality in state court judgments" and "violates
federalism-based principles of state sovereignty. '39
The broad view of federal habeas jurisdiction, with all of its attendant
problems and criticisms, began to be construed much more narrowly in
1977. In Wainwright v. Sykes,40 the Court started to move toward a some-
what more "rigid ... enforcement of state procedural rules based on no-
tions of federalism, comity and finality," 4 1 indicating that it would afford
greater deference to state procedural requirements. If a petitioner did
not follow proper procedure in raising a claim within the state system on
either direct appeal or postconviction review, the claim was considered
procedurally flawed. The Court said that such a procedurally defective
claim could only be heard if the petitioner could subsequently demon-
strate cause for failure to comply with state rules and that actual
prejudice resulted.42
The obstacles faced by a petitioner claiming actual innocence based on
DNA evidence are further complicated by these requirements because
the newly-discovered evidence at issue does not fit well into existing pro-
cedural schemes or established constitutional doctrine. 43 Under common
law, for example, the availability of habeas corpus was extremely narrow
in that it was usually time barred following the term of the court in which
the judgment of conviction was entered. 44 Although most states have al-
tered their statutory schemes to provide extended periods in which a peti-
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2002).
36. Lisa R. Duffett, Note, Habeas Corpus and Actual Innocence of the Death Sentence
After Sawyer v. Whitley: Another Nail in the Coffin of State Capital Defendants, 44 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 121, 126-27 (1993).
37. Fai v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
38. Id. at 401-02.
39. Duffett, supra note 36, at 127 (citing IRA P. ROBBINS, TOWARD A MORE JUST AND
EFFEcTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES 42 (1990) ("Some mem-
bers of the state judiciary . . .view federal habeas corpus review of state court criminal
convictions as an affront to their sovereignty.")).
40. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
41. Duffett, supra note 36, at 129-30.
42. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 84-87.
43. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 10.
44. Id. at 9.
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tioner can bring a claim, only fifteen states permit new trial motions
based on newly-discovered evidence made more than three years after
conviction. 45 This means that if a prisoner sought to discover DNA evi-
dence that could prove potentially exonerative, generally speaking, he
would be barred from doing so.
The reasoning behind these commonly-accepted restrictions on federal
habeas corpus review is typically attributed to several factors:
- The strong presumption that the verdict is correct because the
accused was found guilty by a jury of peers after a trial conducted
with full constitutional protections.
- The need for finality.
- The recognition that the likelihood of more accurate determina-
tions of guilt or innocence diminishes over time as memories
fade, witnesses disappear, and the opportunity for perjury
increases.
- The need to conserve judicial resources by not opening the flood-
gates to meritless and costly claims.46
This traditional understanding of the need to limit the availability of
habeas corpus, coupled with the assumption that there can be no relief
granted where there is no constitutional error, affords little hope to the
petitioner claiming actual innocence based on DNA evidence. Despite
the exonerative potential of DNA testing, the need for finality and the
fact that the petitioner is no longer approaching the courts as one pre-
sumed innocent in the eyes of the law, requires that the evidence meet an
extraordinarily high threshold.47
While concerns regarding states' rights, judicial conservation, and the
value of finality in the criminal justice system are still valid, DNA testing
poses a serious challenge to the other commonly-accepted restrictions on
federal habeas corpus. For example, the arguments favoring the strong
presumption that a verdict is correct and the likelihood that more accu-
rate determinations of guilt or innocence diminishes with time are weak-
ened by the advent of DNA testing.48 The presumption that verdicts are
correct is contradicted by the fact that there is a growing number of cases
that have been vacated by exclusionary evidence resulting from DNA
testing.49 It also appears that the results of DNA testing not only main-
tain their evidentiary significance over extended periods of time, but also
increase in probative value as "technological advances and growing
databases amplify the ability to identify perpetrators and eliminate
suspects. ' '50
Although DNA testing challenges the traditional understanding of the
need to limit the availability of habeas corpus, it is difficult to reconcile
45. Id.
46. Id. (internal citation omitted).
47. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
48. RECOMMENI)ATIONS, supra note 2, at 9-10.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id.
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the approach petitioners would have the courts take with state and fed-
eral postconviction procedures. In both state and federal court, it is as-
sumed that a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus already has, in hand,
newly-discovered evidence that will prove his innocence.5' A petitioner
in a postconviction DNA case, however, invariably attempts to procure
evidence that he can only hope will help to prove his innocence.52 The
difficulty is that it is not clear as to the legal theory or procedure that
might entitle a petitioner, first, to discover the evidence and, second, to
present any favorable results in a judicial proceeding. 53
B. BRADY. A RIGHT TO TESTING?
Even in the absence of formal, postconviction discovery procedures,
some petitioners have been successful in gaining access to DNA testing
under Brady v. Maryland.54 In Brady, the petitioner was found guilty of
murder in the first degree and his conviction was affirmed by the Mary-
land Court of Appeals.55 After his conviction was affirmed, however, the
petitioner discovered that the prosecutor withheld a statement made by
the petitioner's confederate. 56 The statement contained an admission of
the actual homicide and, based on this newly-discovered evidence, the
petitioner moved for a new trial.57
The motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court and was dis-
missed without prejudice by the Court of Appeals, as to relief under Ma-
ryland's postconviction relief statute. Appealing from an unfavorable
ruling in the trial court, the petitioner again reached the Court of Ap-
peals. This time, the court held that the prosecutor's suppression of the
statement denied the petitioner due process of law.58 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court agreed, holding "that the suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespec-
tive of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
59
Relying on Brady, the court in Dabbs v. Vergari permitted postconvic-
tion DNA testing as a prelude to a possible motion to vacate a conviction
based on newly-discovered evidence. 60 This extended application of
Brady initially appears to provide a constitutional avenue for access to
DNA testing; however, other courts have found that to refuse testing is




54. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
55. Id. at 84.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 85.
59. Id. at 87.
60. Dabbs v. Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1990).
61. See, e.g., Ohio v. Wogenstahl, No. C-970238, 1998 WL 306561, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 12, 1998) (unpublished opinion).
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example, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined that the request for
DNA testing was nothing more than a request for discovery and stated:
"We have repeatedly held that the trial court is not required to grant
discovery during the initial stages of postconviction proceedings. '62
While it is quite clear that a defendant has a constitutional right to be
informed of and provided exculpatory evidence, it is unclear how this
right applies to DNA testing. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, for example, recently noted that due process is satisfied
as long as the ultimate disclosure in question is made before it is too late
for the defendant to make use of it.63 If a petitioner's trial took place
prior to 1994, even if the state produced favorable information resulting
from DNA testing, it is unlikely that it would have proven beneficial at
the time of trial. 64 This creates a problem when the decision in Brady
requires that "the prosecutor must disclose evidence if, without such dis-
closure, a reasonable probability will exist that the outcome of a trial in
which the evidence had been disclosed would have been different." 65
It is difficult to apply this rule to DNA testing because, only with the
clarity of hindsight, is it obvious that favorable DNA evidence could eas-
ily have considerable impact on the outcome of a case decided before
DNA evidence was admissible at trial. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit noted, however, that it is not feasible to spec-
ify the timing of disclosure as required under Brady, "except in terms of
the sufficiency, under the circumstances, of the defense's opportunity to
use the evidence when disclosure is made."'66 For this reason, and be-
cause DNA evidence was not generally admissible before 1994, the exis-
tence of the evidence would not have altered the outcome of a trial and
would not, therefore, be subject to the requirements laid out in Brady.
C. CARRIER: ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION
Due to the reluctance of courts to allow collateral remedies to relitigate
a petitioner's guilt or innocence, the traditional black-letter rule stated
that claims of actual innocence based on newly-discovered evidence were
insufficient for postconviction relief.6 7 Emphasizing this point in Town-
send v. Sain, the Supreme Court stated that "the existence ... of newly
discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a
ground for relief on federal habeas corpus" unless accompanied by a con-
stitutional violation. 68 In Murray v. Carrier, however, the Court changed
its focus from seemingly-inflexible procedures to the issue of innocence
as the inquiry of primary importance, at least as it pertains to habeas
62. Id. at *1.
63. United States v. Reyes, 270 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 2001).
64. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
65. In re United States, 267 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
66. Id. (emphasis in original).
67. Henry Pietrkowski, Note, The Diffusion of Due Process in Capital Cases of Actual
Innocence After Herrera, 70 C.-KEN'r L. REV. 1391, 1393 (1995).
68. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963).
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claims based on a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 69
The Court's change of focus was somewhat subtle in that it did not alter
any existing procedural requirements. In order to obtain review of a pro-
cedurally defaulted petition, for example, a petitioner was still required
to show cause for the default and that prejudice resulted.70 Since the
petitioner in Carrier was unable to show cause, the Court refused to en-
tertain his petition.7' The Court reasoned that if the procedural default
resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel, as the petitioner argued,
then the requirements of the Sixth Amendment impute responsibility to
the state, and the petitioner, therefore, failed to exhaust all available state
remedies. 72 The finality that underlies the exhaustion doctrine would be
ill served "if a petitioner could raise his ineffective assistance claim for
the first time on federal habeas in order to show cause for a procedural
default [and would deny] 'an opportunity to the state courts to correct a
constitutional violation.'"73
For a petitioner seeking to discover and introduce favorable results
from DNA testing, the procedural requirements reaffirmed in Carrier of-
fer little hope. Addressing the question of actual innocence, however, the
Court was more generous. Justice O'Connor wrote that "[i]n appropriate
cases the principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of
cause and prejudice must yield to the imperative of correcting a funda-
mentally unjust incarceration. '74 The Court went on to say that it ex-
pected the majority of victims claiming a fundamental miscarriage of
justice would still be able to meet the cause and prejudice standard. 75 In
an extraordinary case, however, "where a constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a fed-
eral habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of
cause for the procedural default."'76
This exception demonstrates the Court's willingness to consider the pe-
titioner's claim of innocence and, if necessary, "yield to the imperative of
correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration. '77 Unfortunately for the
petitioner seeking DNA testing to challenge his incarceration, Carrier's
adherence to postconviction procedure still does not make clear that the
petitioner has any right to discover DNA evidence so that he can poten-
tially demonstrate that his incarceration is fundamentally unjust. In addi-
tion, even if a court were to waive the show-cause and prejudice
requirements, unless the petitioner could demonstrate that his incarcera-
tion was the result of a constitutional violation, the exception would not
69. Duffett, supra note 36, at 132-33.
70. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
71. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489.
72. Id. at 488-89.
73. Id. at 489 (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)).
74. Id. at 495 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
75. Id. at 495-96.
76. Id. at 496 (emphasis added).
77. Engle, 456 U.S. at 135.
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apply.78
D. SAWYER: DEFINING ACrUAL INNOCENCE
In Sawyer v. Whitley, the Supreme Court further defined the funda-
mental miscarriage of justice, or actual innocence, exception. 79 This case
is instructive in that it helps to explain the reasoning behind the actual
innocence exception. It is important to note, however, that the Court's
analysis deals with actual innocence of the death sentence, a closely-re-
lated but different application of the exception as it would be employed
by a petitioner seeking complete exoneration. The issue before the Court
was whether a petitioner bringing a successive, abusive, or defaulted fed-
eral habeas claim was actually innocent. 80 If so, the Court would be able
to reach the merits of a claim that would otherwise have been barred.
After the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the petitioner's convic-
tion of capital murder, the petitioner filed his first federal habeas petition,
which was denied on the merits.8' After granting a stay and holding an
evidentiary hearing on the second petition for postconviction relief, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied
one claim on the merits and held that the other claims were barred as
either abusive or successive.8 2 Undeterred, the petitioner applied for a
certificate of probable cause on the issue of whether he had demonstrated
that he was "actually innocent of the death penalty" so that the court
could reach the merits of his second petition. 3
By the time this issue reached the Supreme Court, the exception to the
Sykes requirement that a federal habeas petitioner demonstrate cause
and prejudice had already been established. Three cases in particular,
Kuhlmann v. Wilson,84 Murray v. Carrier,8 5 and Smith v. Murray,8 6 ex-
tended the actual innocence exception to encompass successive, abusive,
and procedurally defaulted claims, provided that "failure to hear the
claims would constitute a 'miscarriage of justice."' 8 7 This meant that in
order for the Court to reach the merits in Sawyer, the petitioner would
have to demonstrate that he fell within the exception.
The Court had already decided a number of cases prior to Sawyer in
which it emphasized the narrow scope of the actual innocence exception,
78. "tW]here a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent ...." Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added). Denying a
petitioner access to DNA evidence is not, in and of itself, a constitutional violation. See
infra Section E.
79. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
80. Id. at 335.
81. Id. at 337.
82. Id. at 338.
83. Id.
84. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
85. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
86. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
87. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339.
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but had never defined what it meant to be "actually innocent." 88 In the
context of Sawyer, however, the Court was required not only to define its
meaning, but also to make its application workable through relatively ob-
jective standards. 89 To do so, the Court adopted the objective factors that
the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits employed as
requirements that must be shown to exist before a defendant is "eligible"
to have the death penalty imposed.90
The Eleventh Circuit's determination of a petitioner's eligibility for the
death sentence was based upon the following:
[A] petitioner may make a colorable showing that he is actually inno-
cent of the death penalty by presenting evidence that an alleged con-
stitutional error implicates all of the aggravating factors found to be
present by the sentencing body. That is, but for the alleged constitu-
tional error, the sentencing body could not have found any aggravat-
ing factors .... [and therefore] lacked the discretion to impose the
death penalty. 91
The Supreme Court defined actual innocence and stated the rule using
similar language. In order to determine whether the petitioner is actually
innocent of the death sentence, he must show "by clear and convincing
evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would find
him eligible for the death penalty. 9 2
Despite Sawyer's expanded analysis of the actual innocence exception,
it affords little more to a petitioner seeking exoneration through DNA
testing than does Carrier. Assuming exculpatory evidence results from
DNA testing and provides clear and convincing evidence such that no
reasonable juror would vote to convict, unless this evidence is couched in
a claim of constitutional error, the actual innocence exception would,
once again, not apply.
E. HERRERA: A GLIMMER OF HOPE?
The actual innocence exception represents the courts' willingness to
consider a claim of actual innocence in order to correct convictions that
would otherwise be fundamentally unjust. Even so, courts have refused
to entertain such claims in the absence of an underlying constitutional
violation.93 This means that even if a petitioner can prove through newly-
discovered evidence that he did not commit the crime for which he was
convicted, unless the claim is coupled with a showing of constitutional
error, there can be no relief.
This result, while harsh, is consistent with precedent. In 1963, Chief
Justice Warren stated that where newly-discovered evidence is alleged in
88. Id. at 340.
89. Id. at 341.
90. Id. at 347.
91. Id. at 347 n.15 (quoting Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1183 (11th Cir. 1991)
(emphasis in original)).
92. Id. at 348.
93. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400.
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a federal habeas application, if the evidence could not reasonably have
been presented to the trier of facts, the court must grant an evidentiary
hearing.94 "Of course," he continued, "such evidence must bear upon the
constitutionality of the applicant's detention." 95 In Herrera, the Court
simply reemphasized this rule by declaring that "federal habeas courts sit
to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitu-
tion-not to correct errors of fact." 96
Although this rule is well established, Herrera presented the Court with
a unique opportunity in that it was the first time a petitioner sought relief
relying solely on a claim of actual innocence based on newly-discovered
evidence. 97 Without an accompanying claim that a constitutional viola-
tion occurred in the underlying state criminal proceeding, the Court was
forced to rely on earlier cases that, while allowing for the actual inno-
cence exception, did so with the understanding that it was available "only
where a prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable
showing of factual innocence." 98
Ten years after his capital murder conviction, the petitioner in Herrera
again sought relief in federal court.99 He had already unsuccessfully chal-
lenged his conviction in state appeals and collateral proceedings and in a
previous federal habeas petition. 00 In his second petition, however, the
petitioner claimed that he was actually innocent and was, for this reason,
entitled to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of pro-
tection against cruel and unusual punishment and due process of law. 1° 1
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the argument
had an "elemental appeal," but ultimately rejected it. 10 2
The Court quickly rejected the petitioner's Eighth Amendment claim
by distinguishing it from every case upon which the petitioner relied."' 3
As for the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Court said that since the
petitioner had already been afforded the presumption of innocence at a
fair trial, and because he was found guilty of capital murder beyond a
reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence disappeared. 0 4 The pe-
titioner, therefore, came before the Court not as one who was "inno-
cent," but as "one who ha[d] been convicted by due process of law of two
brutal murders."' 1 5 For this reason, the Court found that the petitioner
was no longer entitled to the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
guarantee.
94. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 317.
95. Id.
96. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400.
97. Pietrkowski, supra note 67, at 1397.
98. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 (quoting Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454) (emphasis added)).
99. Id. at 393.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 398.
103. Id. at 405-07.
104. Id. at 399.
105. Id. at 399-400.
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This reasoning would apply just as well to a petitioner seeking review
of a claim of actual innocence based on DNA evidence. Such a peti-
tioner, having been convicted at a fair trial, would no longer enjoy the
presumption of innocence and would not be entitled to judicial review of
his claim. The Court suggested, however, that "a truly persuasive demon-
stration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution
of a defendant unconstitutional.' ' 10 6 Although this statement had no
practical effect for the petitioner in Herrera because his newly-discovered
evidence was insufficient to satisfy the extraordinarily high threshold
showing set by the Court, 10 7 it suggests that a petitioner who could prove
his actual innocence through DNA testing would be entitled to judicial
review of his claim.
On the other hand, the Court was clear that a state's refusal to enter-
tain a claim based on newly-discovered evidence does not transgress any
"principle of fundamental fairness 'rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people."' 0 8 Furthermore, the Court observed that "'[d]ue
process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at
whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent per-
son.' To conclude otherwise would all but paralyze our system for en-
forcement of the criminal law." 10 9
These statements emphasize the fact that while an exception may be
available in extraordinary circumstances, it is far from the rule. The ac-
tual innocence exception is based on the "equitable discretion" of habeas
courts simply to ensure that an innocent person is not incarcerated as the
result of federal constitutional error.' 10 In short, a claim of actual inno-
cence is not a constitutional claim in itself, but merely "a gateway through
which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred consti-
tutional claim considered on the merits."''II
Over the cries of a passionate dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist made
the argument that federal habeas corpus is simply not the correct mecha-
nism for relief absent a claim of constitutional error. Justice Blackmun,
writing for the dissent, said that "[n]othing could be more contrary to
contemporary standards of decency, or more shocking to the conscience,
than to execute a person who is actually innocent."'1 2 He went on to
argue that if a prisoner was actually innocent of the crime for which he
106. Id. at 417.
107. Id. at 417-19.
108. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202
(1977)).
109. Id. at 399 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208).
110. Id. at 404.
111. Id. In a recent, separate opinion respecting the denial of a petition for rehearing
en banc, Judge Luttig of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals directly addressed whether
there exists a constitutional right to postconviction DNA testing and concluded that such a
right does, in fact, exist. Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 310-12 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J.,
concurring in judgment).
112. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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was convicted, then to execute, and possibly even incarcerate, 1 3 such a
person would undeniably violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment.' 14 The problem with this argu-
ment is that a court cannot reach the issue of innocence before consider-
ing whether the petitioner's due process rights were violated because the
petitioner is not "legally innocent," having been convicted at a fair
trial." 5 Since these rights can only be properly analyzed in terms of pro-
cedural, as opposed to substantive, due process, the only question prop-
erly before a federal habeas court is whether the petitioner is entitled to
judicial review of his claim.'" 6
The more appropriate channel for reviewing a claim of actual inno-
cence is an appeal to executive clemency. This, Rehnquist argued, not
habeas corpus, is the traditional remedy for preventing miscarriages of
justice when the judicial process has been exhausted.' 17 Justice Scalia
was less apologetic in stating his concurrence:
There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice
(if that were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to de-
mand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of inno-
cence brought forward after conviction. In saying that such a right
exists, the dissenters apply nothing but their personal opinions to in-
validate the rules of more than two-thirds of the States, and a Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure for which this Court itself is
responsible. ' 19
Describing executive clemency as the "fail safe" in our criminal justice
system, Rehnquist explained that history is replete with examples of
newly-discovered evidence leading to the exoneration of wrongfully-con-
victed individuals. 1 9 Therefore, while procedurally barred from judicial
review, a prisoner seeking exoneration based on newly-discovered DNA
evidence can always seek extra-judicial review by appealing to executive
clemency.
The dissent argued, and critics agree,' 20 that executive clemency is in-
sufficient and that constitutional guarantees were not meant to rest upon
the unreviewable discretion of the executive branch.' 2' If so, the remedy
for the violation of a vested legal right would depend upon an "act of
grace" and we would cease to live under a government of laws.' 22 The
fact of the matter, however, is that "it is improbable that evidence of
113. Id. at 432 n.2.
114. Id. at 431.
115. Id. at 408 n.6.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 411-12.
118. Id. at 427-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 415.
120. See, e.g., Pietrkowski, supra note 67, at 1401-14 (arguing that executive clemency is
inherently arbitrary because there are no established standards that an executive official is
bound to follow, and decisions may be based on any number of factors including morality,
personal preference, and political persuasion).
121. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 439-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 440 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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innocence as convincing as [Herrera] requires would fail to produce an
executive pardon. ' 123 This is particularly true in light of the accuracy of
DNA testing. A petitioner who can prove his innocence through exculpa-
tory DNA evidence, despite having been convicted in a court of law be-
yond all reasonable doubt, is likely to be granted clemency.
Unless a petitioner is able to gain access to postconviction DNA test-
ing, however, the availability of extra-judicial review is relatively
meaningless.
It is one thing to say that further access to the apparatus of the crimi-
nal justice system must at some point be curtailed in the indisputable
interest of finality. It is another altogether to say that, having cur-
tailed that access to the courts, one will even be denied access to
evidence in the government's hands that he could present to the ex-
ecutive in an effort to prevent a miscarriage of justice, after he has
been told that it is the role of the executive, not the courts, to pre-
vent miscarriages of justice which, because of finality, are no longer
remediable through the judicial process. Not only would such be
fundamentally unfair; it would[ ] constitute, by definition, wholly ar-
bitrary governmental conduct. 124
III. CONCLUSION
Even though executive clemency appears promising to a prisoner
claiming actual innocence based on DNA testing, discovery of such evi-
dence is still problematic. It is unclear from the discussion in Brady
whether DNA testing would fall under the constitutionally-protected
right to be informed of and provided exculpatory evidence before it is too
late for the defendant to make use of it.125 If a court were to grant a
request for discovery based on Brady, a prisoner would then be able to
use any favorable evidence in his filing for executive clemency. As for
pursuing federal habeas relief, however, should a court grant a request
for postconviction discovery, it would then be faced with the issue of
whether the petitioner has a constitutional right to judicial review. If the
petitioner could not provide a separate constitutional basis for his claim,
his lack of access to DNA evidence would, by itself, be an insufficient
basis for relief.
In Sykes, the Supreme Court acknowledged the actual innocence ex-
ception, which allows for judicial review in a situation where a petitioner
can prove his innocence despite a failure to meet other requirements typi-
cally associated with federal habeas jurisprudence, namely, cause for fail-
ure to comply with state rules and a showing that actual prejudice
resulted. 126 The requirement that a claim of actual innocence be accom-
panied by an underlying claim of constitutional error, however, could not
123. Id. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring).
124. Harvey, 285 F.3d at 320 (Luttig, J., concurring in judgment).
125. See Reyes, 270 F.3d at 1166-67.
126. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 84-87.
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be set aside. Faced with this issue in Herrera, the Court reaffirmed earlier
rulings holding that absent a constitutional violation in the underlying
state proceedings, claims of actual innocence based on newly-discovered
evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas
relief. 127
Even so, if a petitioner could gain access to DNA evidence and demon-
strate that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted,
given the high level of accuracy in DNA testing, it is likely that he would
be able to meet the extraordinarily high threshold showing set by the
Court in Herrera. If a petitioner could meet this standard, it seems clear
that a claim of actual innocence alone would warrant federal habeas re-
view. Instead of requiring an accompanying claim of constitutional error,
the innocence claim itself would be considered a constitutional claim de-
manding the attention of the Court.
Unwilling to wait for the appropriate fact situation to test the potential
for review made available in Herrera, however, a number of Congres-
sional bills were introduced in 2001 that were designed to provide more
reliable remedies. 128 These bills represent a bipartisan effort to reduce
the risk of wrongful convictions, particularly in capital cases, and even
enjoy the support of a number of those who support capital
punishment.129
The best supported of the proposed legislation is the Innocence Protec-
tion Act ("IPA"). Referring to Herrera, and to the suggestion that a per-
suasive showing of innocence after trial would render the execution of a
prisoner unconstitutional, 130 the IPA, as it was originally introduced, pro-
poses to:
(1) [S]ubstantially implement the Recommendations of the National
Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence... by authorizing
DNA testing in appropriate cases;
(2) prevent the imposition of unconstitutional punishments ... and
(3) ensure that wrongfully convicted persons have an opportunity to
establish their innocence through DNA testing, by requiring the
preservation of DNA evidence for a limited period.' 3'
The IPA has since been modified by the Senate Judiciary Committee, 3 2
but maintains its principal features, including guidelines for the courts,
127. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400.
128. See, e.g., Innocence Protection Act, S. 486, 107th Cong. (2001); National Death
Penalty Moratorium Act, S. 233, 107th Cong. (2001); Accuracy in Judicial Administration
Act, H.R. 321, 107th Cong. (2001); Criminal Justice Integrity and Innocence Protection
Act, S. 800, 107th Cong. (2001).
129. For example, since the Innocence Protection Act takes no position on the death
penalty itself, it has gained the support of Senator Smith (R-OR), Senator Lieberman (D-
CT), Representative LaHood (R-IL), and others. The Innocence Protection Act of 2001,
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legis
lation (last visited Jan. 4, 2003).
130. S. 486 § 101(a)(13).
131. S. 486 § 101(b)(1)-(3).
132. The IPA was reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and was
placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar on October 16, 2002.
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funding for testing, better standards for representation, and even com-
pensation for the wrongfully convicted. If enacted, the IPA will provide a
distinctly superior alternative to filing a federal habeas petition or a re-
quest for executive clemency when asserting a postconviction claim of
actual innocence based on DNA evidence. Rather than trying to incorpo-
rate a claim of actual innocence into ill-fitting existing procedural
schemes or established constitutional doctrine, the IPA will offer a proce-
dure customized for reviewing such a claim. By doing so, federal habeas
courts' unanswered questions concerning time bars, the right to discovery
and testing, and the availability of a judicial proceeding in which to pre-
sent favorable evidence, will become moot.
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